David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 38 (2):233Ð248 (1993)
Hempel and Giere contend that the existence of provisos poses grave difficulties for any regularity account of physical law. However, Hempel and Giere rely upon a mistaken conception of the way in which statements acquire their content. By correcting this mistake, I remove the problem Hempel and Giere identify but reveal a different problem that provisos pose for a regularity account — indeed, for any account of physical law according to which the state of affairs described by a law-statement presupposes a Humean regularity. These considerations suggest a normative analysis of law-statements. On this view, law-statements are not distinguished from accidental generalizations by the kind of Humean regularities they describe because a law-statement need not describe any Humean regularity. Rather, a law-statement says that in certain contexts, one ought to regard the assertion of a given type of claim, if made with justification, as a proper way to justify a claim of a certain other kind.
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References found in this work BETA
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
W. D. Ross (2002). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
Nancy Cartwright (1983). How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Andreas Hüttemann (2014). Ceteris Paribus Laws in Physics. Erkenntnis 79 (10):1715-1728.
Alexander Reutlinger (2014). Do Statistical Laws Solve the 'Problem of Provisos'? Erkenntnis 79 (10):1759-1773.
John T. Roberts (2014). CP-Law Statements as Vague, Self-Referential, Self-Locating, Statistical, and Perfectly in Order. Erkenntnis 79 (10):1775-1786.
Markus Schrenk (2014). Better Best Systems and the Issue of CP-Laws. Erkenntnis 79 (10):1787-1799.
Matthias Unterhuber (2014). Do Ceteris Paribus Laws Exist? A Regularity-Based Best System Analysis. Erkenntnis 79 (10):1833-1847.
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