Natural Laws in Scientific Practice

Oxford University Press (2000)
Abstract
It is often presumed that the laws of nature have special significance for scientific reasoning. But the laws' distinctive roles have proven notoriously difficult to identify--leading some philosophers to question if they hold such roles at all. This study offers original accounts of the roles that natural laws play in connection with counterfactual conditionals, inductive projections, and scientific explanations, and of what the laws must be in order for them to be capable of playing these roles. Particular attention is given to laws of special sciences, levels of scientific explanation, natural kinds, ceteris-paribus clauses, and physically necessary non-laws.
Keywords Science Philosophy  Philosophy and science  Nature
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Call number Q175.L2442 2000
ISBN(s) 0195331338
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    John Roberts (2010). Some Laws of Nature Are Metaphysically Contingent. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):445-457.
    Marc Lange (2008). Could the Laws of Nature Change? Philosophy of Science 75 (1):69-92.

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