Pain, personal identity, and the deep further fact
Erkenntnis 54 (2):247-271 (2001)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | Consciousness Metaphysics Pain Personal Identity Reductionism | |||||||||
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Timothy Chappell (1998). Reductionism About Persons; and What Matters. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):41-58.
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