Recollection and the Mathematician's Method in Plato's Meno

Philosophia Mathematica 20 (2):143-169 (2012)
Abstract
I argue that recollection, in Plato's Meno , should not be taken as a method, and, if it is taken as a myth, it should not be taken as a mere myth. Neither should it be taken as a truth, a priori or metaphorical. In contrast to such views, I argue that recollection ought to be taken as an hypothesis for learning. Thus, the only methods demonstrated in the Meno are the elenchus and the hypothetical, or mathematical, method. What Plato's Meno demonstrates, then, is that we cannot be philosophers if we fail to make use of the mathematician's hypothetical method.
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