Philosophia Mathematica 20 (2):143-169 (2012)
|Abstract||I argue that recollection, in Plato's Meno , should not be taken as a method, and, if it is taken as a myth, it should not be taken as a mere myth. Neither should it be taken as a truth, a priori or metaphorical. In contrast to such views, I argue that recollection ought to be taken as an hypothesis for learning. Thus, the only methods demonstrated in the Meno are the elenchus and the hypothetical, or mathematical, method. What Plato's Meno demonstrates, then, is that we cannot be philosophers if we fail to make use of the mathematician's hypothetical method.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Lee Franklin (2009). Meno's Paradox, the Slave-Boy Interrogation, and the Unity of Platonic Recollection. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):349-377.
David Wolfsdorf (2008). The Method Εξ ΥποΕσεως at Meno 86e1-87d8. Phronesis 53 (1):35-64.
Thomas Williams (2002). Two Aspects of Platonic Recollection. Apeiron 35 (2):131 - 152.
Cristina Ionescu (2006). The Mythical Introduction of Recollection in the Meno (81A5–E2). Journal of Philosophical Research 31:153-170.
Daniel E. Anderson (1971). The Theory of Recollection in Plato's Meno. Southern Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):225-235.
Joe McCoy (2004). The Appropriation of Myth and the Sayings of the Wise in Plato's Meno and Philebus. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:169-178.
Glenn Rawson (2006). Platonic Recollection and Mental Pregnancy. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2):137-155.
Theodor Ebert (1973). Plato's Theory of Recollection Reconsidered an Interpretation of Meno 80a?86c. Man and World 6 (2):163-181.
Plato (1949). Meno. New York, Liberal Arts Press.
Added to index2012-03-09
Total downloads16 ( #74,784 of 549,715 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #10,483 of 549,715 )
How can I increase my downloads?