Swinburne on the Simplicity of Theism

Abstract This paper argues that (1) Richard Swinburne’s general account of the simplicity of empirical hypotheses fails because it involves a deeply problematic notion of postulating a property, while there is a wide range of hypotheses where the assessment of simplicity rests entirely on the number and kinds of postulated properties, (2) Swinburne’s main argument in ’The Christian God’ for the simplicity of theism, the one based on considerations about pure limitless intentional power, is significantly weaker than he seems to believe. The paper does not draw a conclusion about whether theism is simple
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Similar books and articles
Richard Swinburne (1999). Many Kinds of Rational Theistic Belief. In G. Bruntrup & R. K. Tacelli (eds.), The Rationality of Theism. Kluwer.
Nicola Mößner & Markus Seidel (2008). Is the Principle of Testimony Simply Epistemically Fundamental or Simply Not? Swinburne on Knowledge by Testimony. In Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer & Christian Weidemann (eds.), Richard Swinburne. Christian Philosophy in a Modern World. Ontos.

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