Spearman's principle

Glymour, Scheines, Spirtes, and Kelly argue for ‘Spearman's Principle’: one should (ceteris paribus) favour the theory whose ‘free parameters’ need assume no particular values for the theory to save the ‘constraints’ holding of the phenomena. I argue that the rationale they give for Spearman's Principle fails, but that (contra Cartwright) Spearman's Principle cannot be made to favour either of two theories depending on how they are expressed. I examine how one must motivate the demand for a scientific explanation of a parameter's value and how one justifies believing that a constraint should be explained independent of any parameter's particular value.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/46.4.503
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,651
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

14 ( #311,950 of 1,902,751 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #446,006 of 1,902,751 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.