Philosophy of Science 29 (1):1-6 (1962)
|Abstract||(1) The idea that diffraction of matter particles can only be understood in terms of a temporary wave transformation or 'double manifestation' is an uneconomical ad hoc hypothesis, shattered already in 1923 by the unitary quantum theory of diffraction of Duane which in 1926 became part of the quantum mechanics, with a statistical interpretation of wave-like appearances. (2) Bohr's re-interpretation of Heisenberg's uncertainty of prediction as an indeterminacy of existence rests on an illegitimate literal translation of a wave result into particle language which is at variance with experience as well as with the statistical interpretation. (3) The fact that one can transform the simple and unitary particle mechanics into a complicated wavelike form is only a weak substitute for genuine dualism -- as if one would see dualism in the transformability from the geo- to the heliocentric reference system. (4) The strongest argument against a symmetry of the particle and the wave theory of matter is the explainability of the former in terms of simple postulates of invariance, leaving the wave formalism as a purely ad hoc construction|
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