The right kind of solution to the wrong kind of reason problem

Utilitas 20 (4):472-489 (2008)
Recent discussion of Scanlon's account of value, which analyses the value of X in terms of agents' reasons for having certain pro-attitudes or contra-attitudes towards X, has generated the problem (WKR problem): this is the problem, for the buck-passing view, of being able to acknowledge that there may be good reasons for attributing final value to X that have nothing to do with the final value that X actually possesses. I briefly review some of the existing solutions offered to the WKR problem, including those by Philip Stratton-Lake and Jonas Olson, and offer a new, better one, which accommodates all the relevant cases presented in the literature.
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820808003282
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Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2).
John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.

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