David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):63-83 (2003)
Don Marquis has argued that abortion is immoral because it deprives the fetus of a "future like ours." But Marquis's argument fails by incorrectly assuming that a zygote and the late-term fetus with which it is physically continuous are numerically identical. In fact, the identity of a prebirth human (PBH) across gestation is indeterminate, such that it is determinately morally permissible to destroy an early-term PBH and determinately immoral to destroy a late-term PBH. Beginning at some indeterminate point during gestation and ending at some indeterminate point later in gestation, destroying a PBH is neither determinately morally permissible nor determinately immoral.
|Keywords||Marquis abortion vagueness|
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Robert Lane (2006). Safety, Identity and Consent: A Limited Defense of Reproductive Human Cloning. Bioethics 20 (3):125–135.
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