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- Shalom Lappin (1976). Goodman and Katz on Synonymy. Philosophical Studies 29 (4):279 - 281.
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This article is an invited overview of contemporary issues connected with meaning and the analytic-synthetic distinction.
Jerrold Katz develops a new philosophical position integrating realism and rationalism.
v. 1. Nominalism, constructivism, and relativism in the work of Nelson Goodman -- v. 2. Nelson Goodman's new riddle of induction -- v. 3. Nelson Goodman's philosophy of art -- v. 4. Nelson Goodman's theory of symbols and its applications.
On what seems to be the best interpretation, what Quine calls 'the problem of synonymy' in Two Dogmas is the problem of approximating the extension of our pretheoretic concept of synonymy by clear and respectable means. Quine thereby identified a problem which he himself did not think had any solution, and so far he has not been proven wrong. Some difficulties for providing a solution are discussed in this paper.
A version of the so?called paradox of analysis is enunciated which involves two principles of synonymy, referred to respectively as that of substitution and that of triviality. It is argued that for most ?familiar? concepts of synonymy the former principle can be maintained whereas the latter one has to be rejected. I deal with some solutions to the paradox that have been proposed or discussed by Carnap, Lewy, Feyerabend and Hare, and adhere to Carnap's view that the puzzle arises from the use of unclarified and imprecise notions of synonymy.
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The very idea of informative analysis gives rise to a well-known paradox. Yet a parallel puzzle, herein called the paradox of synonymy, arises for statements which do not express analyses. The paradox of synonymy has a straightforward metalinguistic solution: certain words are referring to themselves. Likewise, the paradox of analysis can be solved by recognizing that certain expressions in an analysis statement are referring to their own semantic structures.
Nelson Goodman's proposal for a reconception of meaning consists in replacing the absolute notion ofsameness of meaning by that oflikeness of meaning (with respect to pertinent contexts). According to this view, synonymy is a matter of degree (of interreplaceability) with identity of expression as a limiting case. Goodman's demonstration that no two expressions are exactly alike in meaning is shown to be unsuccessful. Although it does not make use of quotational contexts for the test of interreplaceability, it is tantamount to their acceptance. Goodman rejects quotational contexts; I argue that they should be accepted. This move offers two advantages.Firstly, and mainly, it allows interlinguistic comparison of meaning, something that has not been deemed possible in the received version of Goodman's account.Secondly, it restores the full scale of likeness of meaning damaged by the renunciation of those contexts that guarantee difference in meaning for diverse expressions.
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