Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change

Cambridge University Press (2004)
Abstract
Joseph LaPorte argues that scientists have not discovered that sentences about natural kinds are true rather than false. Instead, scientists have found that these sentences were vaguely phrased in the language of earlier speakers and they have thus refined the meanings of the terms to validate the sentences. In the process, however, they have also changed the meaning of the terms. This book will appeal to students and professionals in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of language.
Keywords Biology Philosophy  Essentialism (Philosophy
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Call number QH331.L29 2004
ISBN(s) 9780521825993
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Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2009). How Scientific is Scientific Essentialism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):85 - 101.
Jussi Haukioja (2012). Rigidity and Actuality-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):399-410.

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