Rigid designators for properties

Philosophical Studies 130 (2):321 - 336 (2006)
Here I defend the position that some singular terms for properties are rigid designators, responding to Stephen P. Schwartz’s interesting criticisms of that position. First, I argue that my position does not depend on ontological parsimony with respect to properties – e.g., there is no need to claim that there are only natural properties – to get around the problem of “unusual properties.” Second, I argue that my position does not confuse sameness of meaning across possible worlds with sameness of designation, or rigid designation. Third, I argue that my position does not founder by way of failing to assign rigidity the work of grounding a posteriori necessity.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,997
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Keith S. Donnellan (1973). Substances as Individuals. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):711-712.
Saul A. Kripke (1979). A Puzzle About Belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. 239--83.
Saul A. Kripke (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press. 135-164.

View all 10 references

Citations of this work BETA
Jussi Haukioja (2012). Rigidity and Actuality-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):399-410.
Similar books and articles
Genoveva Marti (2004). Rigidity and General Terms. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):129–146.
Berit Brogaard (2007). A Puzzle About Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):635-650.
Hugh S. Chandler (1975). Rigid Designation. Journal of Philosophy 72 (13):363-369.
David Barnett (2002). Against a Posteriori Moral Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):239 - 257.
Michael Devitt (2005). Rigid Application. Philosophical Studies 125 (2):139--165.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

43 ( #46,251 of 1,410,042 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #75,795 of 1,410,042 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.