An Interesting Fallacy concerning Dynamical Supertasks

Recently, Alper, Bridger, Earman and Norton have all proposed examples of dynamic systems that, in their view, are incompatible with classical (Newtonian) mechanics. In the first section of the present paper I shall show that their arguments are all undermined by the same fallacy. The second section proves that their conclusions of incompatibility are indeed false, and that what we are really looking at are new forms of indeterminist evolution of the same kind as that found recently in the literature on supertasks. In the third section of the paper, I argue that one of these new forms of evolution is particularly interesting, and that analysis of it leads to a new vision of the relation between interaction by contact and impenetrability.
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DOI 10.2307/3541705
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Similar books and articles
Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia (2005). An Interesting Fallacy Concerning Dynamical Supertasks. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):321-334.
Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia (1999). Earman and Norton on Supertasks That Generate Indeterminism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):137 - 141.
Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia (2007). Supertasks, Dynamical Attractors and Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (4):724-731.

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