Assertion, knowledge, and invariant standards
| Abstract | Epistemic contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions for knowledge attributions can vary across contexts as a result of shifting epistemic standards. According to Keith DeRose, the “chief bugaboo of contextualism has been the concern that the contextualist is mistaking variability in the conditions of.. | |||||||||
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Keith DeRose (2004). The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346–350.
David Hunter (2007). Contextualism, Skepticism and Objectivity. In R. Stainton & C. Viger (eds.), Compositionality. Context, and Semantic Values.
Adam Leite (2007). How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to DeRose's "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context". Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111 - 129.
Marcus Willaschek (2007). Contextualism About Knowledge and Justification by Default. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):251-272.
Joseph Shieber (2009). Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Philosophia 37 (1):169-181.
Keith DeRose (2006). "Bamboozled by Our Own Words": Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments Against Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):316-338.
John Turri (2010). Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism. Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.
Jim Stone (2007). Contextualism and Warranted Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
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