How to think about informal proofs

Synthese 187 (2):715-730 (2012)
It is argued in this study that (i) progress in the philosophy of mathematical practice requires a general positive account of informal proof; (ii) the best candidate is to think of informal proofs as arguments that depend on their matter as well as their logical form; (iii) articulating the dependency of informal inferences on their content requires a redefinition of logic as the general study of inferential actions; (iv) it is a decisive advantage of this conception of logic that it accommodates the many mathematical proofs that include actions on objects other than propositions; (v) this conception of logic permits the articulation of project-sized tasks for the philosophy of mathematical practice, thereby supplying a partial characterisation of normal research in the field.
Keywords Informal proof  Mathematical practice  Inferential action  Argumentation theory  Speech-act
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-0007-5
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Peter Galison (1990). How Experiments End. Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):103-106.
Y. Rav (1999). Why Do We Prove Theorems? Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Y. Rav (1999). Why Do We Prove Theorems? Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.
Edwin Coleman (2009). The Surveyability of Long Proofs. Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):27-43.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

46 ( #72,820 of 1,725,256 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #110,378 of 1,725,256 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.