How to think about informal proofs

Synthese 187 (2):715-730 (2012)
Abstract
It is argued in this study that (i) progress in the philosophy of mathematical practice requires a general positive account of informal proof; (ii) the best candidate is to think of informal proofs as arguments that depend on their matter as well as their logical form; (iii) articulating the dependency of informal inferences on their content requires a redefinition of logic as the general study of inferential actions; (iv) it is a decisive advantage of this conception of logic that it accommodates the many mathematical proofs that include actions on objects other than propositions; (v) this conception of logic permits the articulation of project-sized tasks for the philosophy of mathematical practice, thereby supplying a partial characterisation of normal research in the field
Keywords Informal proof  Mathematical practice  Inferential action  Argumentation theory  Speech-act
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References found in this work BETA
Jessica Carter (2010). Diagrams and Proofs in Analysis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):1 – 14.

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