Persons, animals, and bodies
Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):95-116 (2004)
| Abstract | The philosophical problem of personal identity starts with something like Descartes’ famous question—“But what then am I?”—construed as an inquiry into the most fundamental nature of creatures like us. Let us stipulate that creatures like us are most fundamentally persons. That is, ‘person’ is the name of our.. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Animal Body Metaphysics Person Descartes | |||||||||
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Jerome A. Shaffer (1966). Persons and Their Bodies. Philosophical Review 75 (January):59-77.
Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (forthcoming). Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem. European Journal of Philosophy.
William Hasker (2004). The Constitution View of Persons. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.
Sydney Shoemaker (1999). Self, Body, and Coincidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (73):287-306.
Charles Taliaferro (1997). Possibilities in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):127-37.
Theodore Sider (2002). Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):45-48.
William Hasker (2004). The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.
Sydney Shoemaker (2008). Persons, Animals, and Identity. Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
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