Why did Kuhn's structure of scientific revolutions cause a Fuss?

Abstract
After the publication of The structure of scientific revolutions, Kuhn attempted to fend off accusations of extremism by explaining that his allegedly ''relativist'' theory is little more than the mundane analytical apparatus common to most historians. The appearance of radicalism is due to the novelty of applying this machinery to the history of science. This defence fails, but it provides an important clue. The claim of this paper is that Kuhn inadvertently allowed features of his procedure and experience as an historian to pass over into his general account of science. Kuhn's familiar claims, that science is directed in part by extra-scientific influences; that the history of science is divided by revolutionary breaks into periods that cannot be easily compared; that there is no ahistorical standard of rationality by which past episodes may be judged; and that science cannot be shown to be heading towards the Truth-these now appear as methodological commitments rather than historico-philosophical theses.
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Andrew T. Domondon (2009). Kuhn, Popper, and the Superconducting Supercollider. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):301-314.
Oscar Moro Abadía (2010). Connecting Historiographical Traditions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1):105-108.
Dunja Šešelja & Christian Straßer (2009). Kuhn and Coherentist Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):322-327.
Adam Timmins (2013). Why Was Kuhn's Structure More Successful Than Polanyi's Personal Knowledge? Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (2):306-317.
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