David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 91 (11):599-618 (1994)
My concern in part I of this paper is with how to make sense of the position that one can have reasons both of duty and inclination for an action one performs but be motivated solely by duty, and more generally that one can have several reasons for an action one performs but be motivated only by some of them. I examine a number of ways of attempting to do this, most of them independent of the Kantian context, and argue that none would be accepted by the proponents of the position, and hence that the position itself is indefensible. I return to Kant in part II and point out that Herman's interpretation of his doctrine of moral worth attributes an indefensible position to him. Then I argue that the face-value interpretation-namely, that morally worthy actions must be performed solely from duty and without any inclination at all-is more plausible and should not be seen as puritanical.
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Benjamin Ferguson (2012). Kant on Duty in the Groundwork. Res Publica 18 (4):303-319.
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