Davidson and Kim on psychophysical laws

Synthese 118 (2):121-44 (1999)
Nearly 30 years have passed since Donald Davidson first presented his ar- gument against the possibility of psychophysical laws in “Mental Events”. The argument applies to intentional rather than phenomenal properties, so whenever I refer to mental properties and to psychophysical laws it should be understood that I mean intentional properties and laws relating them to physical properties. No consensus has emerged over what the argument actually is, and the subsequent versions of it presented by Davidson show significant differences. But many have been inclined to agree with the spirit of the argument and with its conclusion.
Keywords Law  Mental  Metaphysics  Supervenience  Davidson, D  Kim, J
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DOI 10.1023/A:1005052912629
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