Determinism, Randomness, and Value

Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167 (2004)
What values, if any, would be undermined by determinism?[i] Traditionally this question has been tackled by asking whether determinism is compatible with free will or whether it is compatible with moral responsibility. Compatibilists say that determinism would not threaten free will or moral responsibility, and hence that people’s values should not be influenced by whether or not they believe in determinism. Incompatibilists say that determinism would undermine free will or moral responsibility, and hence that a belief in determinism should have a considerable impact on one’s values, precluding many popular evaluative beliefs.
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DOI 10.5840/philtopics2004321/221
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PhilPapers Archive Noa Latham, Determinism, Randomness, and Value
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