David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167 (2004)
What values, if any, would be undermined by determinism?[i] Traditionally this question has been tackled by asking whether determinism is compatible with free will or whether it is compatible with moral responsibility. Compatibilists say that determinism would not threaten free will or moral responsibility, and hence that people’s values should not be influenced by whether or not they believe in determinism. Incompatibilists say that determinism would undermine free will or moral responsibility, and hence that a belief in determinism should have a considerable impact on one’s values, precluding many popular evaluative beliefs.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ted Honderich (2002). How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. 249.
Richard Holton (2009). Determinism, Self-Efficacy, and the Phenomenology of Free Will. Inquiry 52 (4):412-428.
Peter van Inwagen (1975). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (March):185-99.
Galen Strawson (1989). Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism. Inquiry 32 (March):3-27.
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Peter van Inwagen (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran (2007). Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.
Manuel Vargas (2004). Responsibility and the Aims of Theory: Strawson and Revisionism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):218-241.
Added to index2009-09-04
Total downloads127 ( #6,787 of 1,098,410 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #18,654 of 1,098,410 )
How can I increase my downloads?