Online research in philosophy

The advent of the 1905 theory of relativity is rightly considered as a breakthrough moment in the history of physics; in particular. it is widely accepted that it brought a new conception of space and time. The purpose of this work is to reevaluate to what point and in what sense can we consider that the conception of space and time went through a transformation when going from Newtonian mechanics to the theory of relativity.

Touch and sight : the earth and the heavens -- What happens and what is observed -- The velocity of light -- Clocks and foot-rules -- Space-time -- The special theory of relativity -- Intervals in space-time -- Einstein's law of gravitation -- Proofs of Einstein's law of gravitation -- Mass, momentum, energy, and action -- The expanding universe -- Conventions and natural laws -- The abolition of "force" -- What is matter? -- Philosophical consequences.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: a) to explore the compatibility of Minkowski’s space-time representation of the Special theory of relativity with a dynamic conception of space-time; b) to locate its roots in invariant features - like entropic relations - of the propagation of signals in space-time. From its very beginning Minkowski’s four-dimensional space-time was associated with a static view of reality, e.g. a block universe. Einstein added his influential voice to this conception when he wrote: ‘From a “happening” in three-dimensional space, physics becomes (…) an “existence” in the four-dimensional “world”.’ (Einstein, Relativity 1920, 122) Yet it is by no means clear that Minkowski himself was a believer in the block universe. In his 1908 Cologne lecture on ‘Space and Time’ he speaks of a four-dimensional physics but concedes that a ‘necessary’ time order can be established at every world point. Although the conception of the block universe has gained much currency, an alternative view has been in circulation since the 1910s according to which the trajectories of particles constitute histories in space-time. (Robb 1914, Cunningham 1915, Carathéodorys 1924, Schlick 1917, Reichenbach 1924).

This column is a followup to a previous Alternate View column [Analog, June-'89] about "wormholes", faster-than-light travel, and time machines, which was based on a spectacular theoretical breakthrough in general relativity. It described how a sufficiently advanced civilization might construct a stable wormhole (a curved-space shortcut between one region of space and another) and use it both for faster-than-light travel and for time travel, with no laws of physics violated in the process except causality (the principle that a cause must precede its effects).

A description of consciousness leads to a contradiction with the postulation from special relativity that there can be no connections between simultaneous event. This contradiction points to consciousness involving quantum level mechanisms. The Quantum level description of the universe is re- evaluated in the light of what is observed in consciousness namely 4 Dimensional objects. A new improved interpretation of Quantum level observations is introduced. From this vantage point the following axioms of consciousness is presented. Consciousness consists of two distinct components, the observed U and the observer I. The observed U consist of all the events I is aware of. A vast majority of these occur simultaneously. Now if I were to be an entity within the space-time continuum, all of these events of U together with I would have to occur at one point in space-time. However, U is distributed over a definite region of space-time (region in brain). Thus, I is aware of a multitude of space-like separated events. It is seen that this awareness necessitates I to be an entity outside the space-time continuum. With I taken as such, a new concept called concept A is introduced. With the help of concept A a very important axiom of consciousness, namely Free Will is explained. Libet s Experiment which was originally seen to contradict Free will, in the light of Concept A is shown to support it. A variation to Libet s Experiment is suggested that will give conclusive proof for Concept A and Free Will.

The Lorentz-formulae are deduced from three factual statements the physical meaning of which is explained in terms of operations with clocks, light-signals and measuring rods. These statements are: (1) The time-length of a process is invariant. (2) The velocity of light is the same in all inertial systems. (3) The velocity of light is independent of the source. It is also shown that these statements can be deduced from the Lorentz-formulae. They are the physical content of the latter. The principle of relativity and the light-principle together, however, contain more physical meaning than the Lorentz-formulae. Operational definitions are given for all relevant concepts.

Time's speed is a subjective illusion created by the accumulation of individual perception onto reflections within the mind . It is defined by the frequency of the interactions of thought process, where distance related to space is time's reciprocal. Consequently, "space" separated from "time" is a manifestation of structured consciousness, wherein experience exists as feedback of the mind projecting onto consciousness the illusion of separate entities. The direction and the speed of light is constant only when not influenced by different factors, such as gravity and material density. Light is also absorbed and emitted in atoms. This fact of differentiated speed and absorption/emission is of crucial importance to the following discussion relating to the mind's interpretational mechanisms.

In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between Husserl’s original question of time and the problem of a phenomenology of space constitution as it was first developed in the his manuscripts from the nineteenth century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our representation of space, of the geometrization of intuitive space, and of the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time.

Special relativity was based on the theorem that time is affected by motion. Einstein's proof of this was an imaginary experiment with clocks, using light as a synchronizing signal. He has said that the kind of signal was immaterial. Subsequent interpreters have stated that sound signals could just as well have been used. Today any airplane passenger's watch denies Einstein's mathematics, had he used sound. The Lorentz-Einstein transformation equations in which the speed of sound is substituted for the speed of light are unthinkable. But if they do not hold with sound as the signal, no more do they with light, for the process is identical. The transformation equations for space are based on the variability of time, and are therefore likewise denied.

In modern physics, the constant “c” plays a twofold role. On the one hand, “c” is the well known velocity of light in an empty Minkowskian space–time, on the other hand “c” is a characteristic number of Special Relativity that governs the Lorentz transformation and its consequences for the measurements of space–time intervals. We ask for the interrelations between these two, at first sight different meanings of “c”. The conjecture that the value of “c” has any influence on the structure of space–time is based on the operational interpretation of Special Relativity, which uses light rays for measurements of space–time intervals. We do not follow this way of reasoning but replace it by a more realistic approach that allows to show that the structure of the Minkowskian space–time can be reconstructed already on the basis of a restricted classical ontology (Mittelstaedt, Philosophie der Physik und der Raum-Zeit, Mannheim: BI-Wissenschaftsverlag, 1988 and Mittelstaedt, Kaltblütig: Philosophie von einem rationalen Standpunkt, Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag, pp. 221–240, 2003 ), and that without any reference to the propagation of light. However, the space–time obtained in this way contains still an unknown constant. We show that this constant agrees numerically with “c” but that it must conceptually clearly be distinguished from the velocity of light. Hence, we argue for a clear distinction between the two faces of “c” and for a dualism of space–time and matter.