David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):23-43 (2004)
The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can be understood as being simply one which is composed of concepts, without compromising this intuitive view of the relation between beliefs and experiences.
|Keywords||Believability Concept Content Epistemology State|
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Citations of this work BETA
Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha (2011). Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
Josefa Toribio (2008). State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):351 - 361.
Josefa Toribio (2011). Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):177-193.
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