Reason-Giving Statements

Dissertation, City University of New York (1987)
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Abstract

It is commonplace to observe that explanations of human behavior diverge from explanations of other sorts, though it is far from commonplace to articulate exactly what this divergence amounts to. One very obvious and rather marvelous fact about explanations in the human sciences is that the subject matter talks and sometimes literally explains itself. This dissertation is an essay about what sort of difference language participation makes to explaining what language participants do. ;Currently, action theorists are recruiting insights from philosophy of natural language to shed light on the relation between actions and the reason-giving statements that explain them. The four contemporary action theorists studied here maintain that certain types of thought do cause actions. And further, they maintain that from a true reason-giving statement one can infer the particular thoughts that caused an individual action. ;In Chapter I, I show how a standard model of explanation fails to reveal how reason-giving statements convey causal thoughts. In Chapter II, I try to pinpoint how a special mode of description reserved for action can be distinguished from other ways of describing occurrences. ;Different action theorists focus on different linguistic facts from which they draw their conclusions about the nature and structure of actions themselves. In Chapter III, I examine how the difference between claims of Donald Davidson and Alvin Goldman regarding individuation of actions may be traced back to their respective ways of construing the data of talk about actions. ;In Chapter IV, I examine Jennifer Hornsby's thesis that a special form of entailment follows exclusively from sentences about actions, based on their grammatical or 'surface' form. ;In Chapter V, I study the way Donald Davidson and John Searle apply 'holistic' theories of meaning to the problem of analyzing action explanations. ;Overall the results here go a modest way, only to demonstrate that we know less today than might be supposed about reasons and actions

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