David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319 (2012)
This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine’s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not only explains their differences on the question of analyticity, but points to a Quinean way to answer a challenge that Quine posed to Carnap. The answer to this challenge leads to a Quinean view of analyticity such that arithmetical truths are analytic, according to Quine’s own remarks, and set theory is at least defensibly analytic.
|Keywords||Carnap Quine Analyticity Explication Mathematics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Paul Benacerraf (1965). What Numbers Could Not Be. Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Michael Dummett (1974). The Significance of Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis. Synthese 27 (3-4):351 - 397.
Alex George (2000). On Washing the Fur Without Wetting It. Mind 109 (433):1--24.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Cory Juhl (2009). Analyticity. Routledge.
Marian David (1996). Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 10:281 - 296.
Paul A. Gregory (2003). Two Dogmas'–All Bark and No Bite? Carnap and Quine on Analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
Paul Gregory (2003). 'Two Dogmas'--All Bark and No Bite? Carnap and Quine on Analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633 - 648.
Paul A. Gregory (2003). 'Two Dogmas' -- All Bark and No Bite? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633-648.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2001). Boghossian on Analyticity. Analysis 61 (4):293–302.
Paul Gregory (2003). Putting the Bite Back Into. Principia 7 (1-2):115-129.
Richard Creath (1991). Every Dogma has its Day. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347 - 389.
John P. Burgess (2004). Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
Paul Artin Boghossian (1996). Analyticity Reconsidered. Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
Olaf Mueller (1998). Does the Quine/Duhem Thesis Prevent Us From Defining Analyticity? Erkenntnis 48 (1):85-104.
Olaf L. Müller (2002). From Within and From Without. Two Perspectives on Analytic Sentences. In Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and meaning: Essays at the interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften.
Verena Mayer (2003). Implicit Thoughts: Quine, Frege and Kant on Analytic Propositions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):61-90.
Added to index2011-02-12
Total downloads88 ( #15,284 of 1,099,868 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #21,199 of 1,099,868 )
How can I increase my downloads?