A notional worlds approach to confusion

Mind and Language 22 (2):150–172 (2007)
People often become confused, mistaking one thing for another, or taking two things to be the same. How should we assign semantic values to confused statements? Recently, philosophers have taken a pessimistic view of confusion, arguing that understanding confused belief demands significant departure from our normal interpretive practice. I argue for optimism. Our semantic treatment of confusion can be a lot like our semantic treatment of empty names. Surprisingly, perhaps, the resulting semantics lets us keep in place more of our everyday interpretive practices in the face of confused belief.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00304.x
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References found in this work BETA
John Perry (2009). Reference and Reflexivity. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mikkel Gerken (2011). Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
Mahrad Almotahari (2013). Flaws of Formal Relationism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):367-376.
Krista Lawlor (2010). Varieties of Coreference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):485-495.

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