Graduate studies at Western
Mind and Language 22 (2):150–172 (2007)
|Abstract||People often become confused, mistaking one thing for another, or taking two things to be the same. How should we assign semantic values to confused statements? Recently, philosophers have taken a pessimistic view of confusion, arguing that understanding confused belief demands significant departure from our normal interpretive practice. I argue for optimism. Our semantic treatment of confusion can be a lot like our semantic treatment of empty names. Surprisingly, perhaps, the resulting semantics lets us keep in place more of our everyday interpretive practices in the face of confused belief.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brad Skow (2008). Haecceitism, Anti-Haecceitism, and Possible Worlds: A Case Study. Philosophical Quarterly 58:97-107.
John Divers (2006). Possible-Worlds Semantics Without Possible Worlds: The Agnostic Approach. Mind 115 (458):187-226.
Shaheen Borna & Gwendolen White (2003). "Sex" and "Gender": Two Confused and Confusing Concepts in the "Women in Corporate Management" Literature. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 47 (2):89 - 99.
B. C. Birchall (1978). Moral Life as the Obstacle to the Development of Ethical Theory. Inquiry 21 (1-4):409 – 424.
Elke Brendel (1993). Partial Worlds and Paradox. Erkenntnis 39 (2):191 - 208.
Daniel C. Dennett (1983). Beyond Belief. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.
Katherine J. Morris (1995). Intermingling and Confusion. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (2):290 – 306.
Krista Lawlor (2005). Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):21-36.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #74,621 of 739,462 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,462 )
How can I increase my downloads?