Confused thought and modes of presentation

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):21-36 (2005)
Abstract
Ruth Millikan has long argued that the phenomenon of confused thought requires us to abandon certain traditional programmes for mental semantics. On the one hand she argues that confused thought involves confused concepts, and on the other that Fregean senses, or modes of presentation, cannot be useful in theorizing about minds capable of confused thinking. I argue that while we might accept that concepts can be confused, we have no reason to abandon modes of presentation. Making sense of confused thought requires recognizing modes of presentation.
Keywords Concept  Confusion  Metaphysics  Mode  Presentation  Thought  Millikan, R
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Krista Lawlor (2010). Varieties of Coreference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):485-495.
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