Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):21-36 (2005)
|Abstract||Ruth Millikan has long argued that the phenomenon of confused thought requires us to abandon certain traditional programmes for mental semantics. On the one hand she argues that confused thought involves confused concepts, and on the other that Fregean senses, or modes of presentation, cannot be useful in theorizing about minds capable of confused thinking. I argue that while we might accept that concepts can be confused, we have no reason to abandon modes of presentation. Making sense of confused thought requires recognizing modes of presentation.|
|Keywords||Concept Confusion Metaphysics Mode Presentation Thought Millikan, R|
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