David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565 (2003)
Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author one's attitudes, but one's self- ascriptions may lack authority. I present this new challenge from social psychology and use it to argue that first-person authority is agential authority: one's self-ascriptions are authoritative, in part anyway, because they are reliable expressions of those attitudes that govern further choices and behavior
|Keywords||Authority Epistemology First Person Reasons Self-ascription Social Psychology|
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Citations of this work BETA
Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2008). Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
Elijah Millgram (2014). Private Persons and Minimal Persons. Journal of Social Philosophy 45 (3):323-347.
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