Memory, anaphora, and content preservation

Philosophical Studies 109 (2):97-119 (2002)
Abstract
  Tyler Burge defends the idea that memory preserves beliefswith their justifications, so that memory's role in inferenceadds no new justificatory demands. Against Burge's view,Christensen and Kornblith argue that memory is reconstructiveand so introduces an element of a posteriori justificationinto every inference. I argue that Burge is right,memory does preserve content, but to defend this viewwe need to specify a preservative mechanism. Toward thatend, I develop the idea that there is something worthcalling anaphoric thinking, which preserves content inBurge's sense of ``content preservation.'' I providea model on which anaphoric thought is a fundamentalfeature of cognitive architecture, consequentlyrejecting the idea that there are mental pronounsin a Language of Thought. Since preservativememory is a matter of anaphoric thinking, thereare limits on the analogy of memory and testimony
Keywords Anaphora  Content  Epistemology  Inference  Justification  Memory  Preservation  Burge, T  Christensen, D  Kornblith, H
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Citations of this work BETA
N. Ángel Pinillos (2011). Coreference and Meaning. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):301 - 324.
N. Ángel Pinillos (2011). Coreference and Meaning. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):301-324.
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