Graduate studies at Western
Garland Pub. (2001)
|Abstract||This book defends a novel theory of singular concepts, emphasizing the pragmatic requirements of singular concept possession and arguing that these requirements must be understood to institute traditions and policies of thought.|
|Keywords||Thought and thinking Concepts Cognition Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$28.71 used (81% off) $29.00 new (80% off) $122.94 direct from Amazon (16% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BF441.L39 2001|
|Through your library||Configure|
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