David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 145 (3):467-495 (2004)
Knowing one’s past thoughts and attitudes is a vital sort of self-knowledge. In the absence of memorial impressions to serve as evidence, we face a pressing question of how such self-knowledge is possible. Recently, philosophers of mind have argued that self-knowledge of past attitudes supervenes on rationality. I examine two kinds of argument for this supervenience claim, one from cognitive dynamics, and one from practical rationality, and reject both. I present an alternative account, on which knowledge of past attitudes is inferential knowledge, and depends upon contingent facts of one’s rationality and consistency. Failures of self-knowledge are better explained by the inferential account
|Keywords||Diachronic Epistemology Inference Past Rationality Self-knowledge Supervenience|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
David Velleman (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
David M. Armstrong (1963). Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? Philosophical Review 62 (4):417-32.
Sydney Shoemaker (1995). Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.
David Velleman (1989). Practical Reflection. Princeton University Press.
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