Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):486-487 (2001)
|Abstract||Humphreys and Forde (H&F) propose that greater within- category structural similarity makes living things more difficult to name. However, recent studies show that normal subjects find it easier to name living than nonliving things when these are matched across category for potential artefacts. Additionally, at the level of single pixels, visual overlap appears to be greater for nonliving things.|
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