Cognitive Neuroscience and Moral Decision-making: Guide or Set Aside?

Neuroethics 4 (2):163-174 (2011)
Abstract
It is by now a well-supported hypothesis in cognitive neuroscience that there exists a functional network for the moral appraisal of situations. However, there is a surprising disagreement amongst researchers about the significance of this network for moral actions, decisions, and behavior. Some researchers suggest that we should uncover those ethics [that are built into our brains ], identify them, and live more fully by them, while others claim that we should often do the opposite, viewing the cognitive neuroscience of morality more like a science of pathology. To analyze and evaluate the disagreement, this paper will investigate some of its possible sources. These may include theoretical confusions about levels of explanation in cognitive science, or different senses of ‘morality’ that researchers are looking to explain. Other causes of the debate may come from empirical assumptions about how possible or preferable it is to separate intuitive moral appraisal from moral decisions. Although we will tentatively favor the ‘Set Aside’ approach, the questions outlined here are open areas of ongoing research, and this paper will be confined to outlining the position space of the debate rather than definitively resolving it
Keywords Moral psychology  Reasoning  Decision-making  Folk theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,084
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Selim Berker (2009). The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience. Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.

View all 26 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Linda K. Treviño (2006). Bad Apples In Bad Barrels Revisited. Business Ethics Quarterly 16 (4):449-473.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-11-18

Total downloads

35 ( #53,258 of 1,101,879 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #68,243 of 1,101,879 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.