Getting the constraints on Popper's probability functions right

Philosophy of Science 60 (1):151-157 (1993)
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Abstract

Shown here is that a constraint used by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) for calculating the absolute probability of a universal quantification, and one introduced by Stalnaker in "Probability and Conditionals" (1970, 70) for calculating the relative probability of a negation, are too weak for the job. The constraint wanted in the first case is in Bendall (1979) and that wanted in the second case is in Popper (1959).

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References found in this work

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
Probability and conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
Popper's 1955 Axiomatization of Absolute Probability.Hugues Leblanc - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2):133-145.
Belief-theoretic formal semantics for first-order logic and probability.Kent Bendall - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):375 - 397.

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