Getting the constraints on Popper's probability functions right

Philosophy of Science 60 (1):151-157 (1993)
Shown here is that a constraint used by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) for calculating the absolute probability of a universal quantification, and one introduced by Stalnaker in "Probability and Conditionals" (1970, 70) for calculating the relative probability of a negation, are too weak for the job. The constraint wanted in the first case is in Bendall (1979) and that wanted in the second case is in Popper (1959).
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DOI 10.1086/289723
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