Analysis 72 (2):244-251 (2012)
In Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts 2009, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Michael Tye claims that seeing can occur independently of seeing-that. Call this The Independence Claim (TIC). Tye supports this ‘general point’ by appeal to cases of ‘ubiquitous error’ (2009: 95). In this article, I show that this strategy fails: it is guilty of a certain blindness to how things look
Keywords Michael Tye  Seeing and seeing that  Looks
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    Michael Tye (1982). A Causal Analysis of Seeing by Michael Tye. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):311-325.
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