Perceptual presence

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502 (2009)
Plausibly, any adequate theory of perception must (a) solve what Alva Noë calls 'the problem of perceptual presence,' and (b) do justice to the direct realist idea that what is given in perception are garden-variety spatiotemporal particulars. This paper shows that, while Noë's sensorimotor view arguably satisfies the first of these conditions, it does not satisfy the second. Moreover, Noë is wrong to think that a naïve realist approach to perception cannot handle the problem of perceptual presence. Section three of this paper develops a version of naïve realism that meets both of the adequacy conditions above. This paper thus provides strong considerations in favor of naïve realism.
Keywords Perceptual Presence  Alva Noë  Thompson Clarke  Seeing surfaces  Phenomenalism  Naïve realism  Illusion
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01351.x
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PhilPapers Archive Jason Leddington, Perceptual presence
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Kristjan Laasik (2011). On Perceptual Presence. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):439-459.
Ignacio Ávila (2015). Perceiving the Intrinsic Properties of Objects. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):55-71.

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