David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 144 (2):171 - 180 (2005)
One can interpret the No Probabilities for Acts-Principle, namely that any adequate quantitative decision model must in no way contain subjective probabilities for actions in two ways: it can either refer to actions that are performable now and extend into the future or it can refer to actions that are not performable now, but will be in the future. In this paper, I will show that the former is the better interpretation of the principle.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Jeffrey (1983). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press.
Leonard J. Savage (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Alvin I. Goldman (1970). A Theory of Human Action. Princeton University Press.
Robert Nozick (1993). The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press.
Brian Skyrms (1980). Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws. Yale University Press.
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