The no probabilities for acts-principle

Synthese 144 (2):171 - 180 (2005)
One can interpret the No Probabilities for Acts-Principle, namely that any adequate quantitative decision model must in no way contain subjective probabilities for actions in two ways: it can either refer to actions that are performable now and extend into the future or it can refer to actions that are not performable now, but will be in the future. In this paper, I will show that the former is the better interpretation of the principle.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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