Troubles with token identity

Philosophical Studies 47 (January):79-94 (1985)
The thesis of "token identity" or "token physicalism" advanced by fodor and others attempts to reconcile materialism with a non-Reductionist view of the special sciences. However, I argue that since the individual events or "tokens" of any science are only designated according to its general types, The former cannot be specified physicalistically while the latter are not. Though attempting to combat a positivistic view of the sciences, Fodor's thesis rests on a positivistic opposition of token and type
Keywords Body  Identity  Metaphysics  Mind
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DOI 10.1007/BF00355088
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