David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):55-75 (2008)
is normative in the sense that (1) it aims to make recommendations for improving human judgment; (2) it aims to have a practical impact on morally and politically significant human decisions and actions; and (3) it studies normative, rational judgment qua rational judgment. These nonstandard ways of understanding ACP as normative collectively suggest a new interpretation of the strong replacement thesis that does not call for replacing normative epistemic concepts, relations, and inquiries with descriptive, causal ones. Rather, it calls for recognizing that the aims and normative inquiries of epistemology and normative psychology have become intermutual in nature. Key Words: Heuristics and biases • applied cognitive psychology • normative psychology • rationality • naturalized epistemology • Epistemics • Applied Naturalized Epistemology • strong replacement • strategic reliabilism • ameliorative psychology.
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Carole J. Lee (2012). A Kuhnian Critique of Psychometric Research on Peer Review. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):859-870.
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