Belief, Reference, and Proposition
Tulane Studies in Philosophy 30:59-81 (1981)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
John Collins (1995). Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference. Analysis 55 (1):2 - 5.
John Perry (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Noûs 13 (December):3-21.
Stephen R. Schiffer (2006). A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports. Noûs 40 (2):361-368.
David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
John N. Williams (1982). The Absurdities of Moore's Paradoxes. Theoria 48 (1):38-46.
Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Andrei A. Buckareff (2004). Acceptance and Deciding to Believe. Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
Agustin Arrieta Urtizberea (2005). 'Neptune' Between 'Hesperus' and 'Vulcan': On Descriptive Names and Non-Existence. Acta Analytica 20 (3):48-58.
Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Outright Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.
Hartry Field (1978). Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-18.
Lisbeth Rechtin & William L. Todd (1974). Propositional Attitudes and Self-Reference. Philosophia 4 (April-July):271-295.
Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton (2005). Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384-395.
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2011-01-09Total downloads0Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |

