David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):651-660 (2002)
Integration (interaction among parts of an entity) is suggested to be necessary for individuality (contra, Metaphysics and the Origin of Species). A synchronic species is an integrated individual that can evolve as a unified whole; a diachronic lineage is a non-integrated historical entity that cannot evolve. Synchronic species and diachronic lineages are consequently suggested to be ontologically distinct entities, rather than alternative perspectives of the same underlying entity (contra Baum (1998), Syst. Biol. 47, 641–653; de Queiroz (1995), Endless Forms: Species and Speciation, pp. 57–75; Genes, Categories and Species). Species concepts usually refer to either one or the other entity; for instance, the Biological Species Concept refers to synchronic species, whereas the Cladistic Species Concept refers to diachronic lineages. The debate over species concepts has often failed to recognise this distinction, resulting in invalid comparisons between definitions that attempt to delineate fundamentally different entities.
|Keywords||Clade Historical entity Individual Integration Lineage Ontology Organism Species|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Thomas A. C. Reydon (2008). Species in Three and Four Dimensions. Synthese 164 (2):161 - 184.
Richard H. Zander (2010). Structuralism in Phylogenetic Systematics. Biological Theory 5 (4):383.
Similar books and articles
Gregory J. Morgan & W. Brad Pitts (2008). Evolution Without Species: The Case of Mosaic Bacteriophages. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):745-765.
Marc Ereshefsky (2010). Darwin's Solution to the Species Problem. Synthese 175 (3):405 - 425.
Richard A. Richards (2010). The Species Problem: A Philosophical Analysis. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas A. C. Reydon (2009). Gene Names as Proper Names of Individuals: An Assessment. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):409-432.
John S. Wilkins (2007). The Concept and Causes of Microbial Species. Studies in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 28 (3):389-408.
Hugh Lehman (1967). Are Biological Species Real? Philosophy of Science 34 (2):157-167.
Bradley E. Wilson (1995). A (Not-so-Radical) Solution to the Species Problem. Biology and Philosophy 10 (3):339-356.
Ingo Brigandt (2003). Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1305–1316.
Mark Wilkinson (1990). A Commentary on Ridley's Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem. Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):433-446.
Mark Ridley (1989). The Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem. Biology and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads37 ( #44,570 of 1,096,831 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #53,739 of 1,096,831 )
How can I increase my downloads?