Interpreting Plato's Republic: Knowledge and Belief

Philosophy Compass 5 (10):854-864 (2010)
Abstract
A distinction between knowledge and belief is set out and justified at the end of Book V of Plato’s Republic. The justification is intended to establish the claim of the philosophers to rule in an ideal state. I set out the argument and explain why considerable disagreement remains about the nature of the distinction and the assumptions on which it rests. I discuss the main options for interpreting the justification, briefly assessing their strengths and weaknesses. I conclude with comments on recent developments, and by drawing attention to a neglected aspect of Plato’s distinction.
Keywords Plato  Metaphysics  Ancient Philosophy  Being  Epistemology  History of Philosophy  Explanation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    R. C. Cross (1964). Plato's Republic. New York, St. Martin's Press.
    Gail Fine (1978). Knowledge and Belief in Republic V. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60 (2):121-39.

    View all 14 references

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Gail Fine (2010). Aristotle's Two Worlds: Knowledge and Belief inPosterior Analytics 1.33. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):323-346.
    Rachel Barney (2008). The Carpenter and the Good. In D. Cairns, F. G. Herrmann & T. Penner (eds.), Pursuing the Good: Ethics and Metaphysics in Plato's Republic. University of Edinburgh.
    Terence Irwin (1995). Plato's Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-09-14

    Total downloads

    49 ( #27,977 of 1,089,153 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    3 ( #30,953 of 1,089,153 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.