David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 55 (3):359-370 (2001)
Moore's paradox arises from the logicaloddity of sentences of the form`P and I do not believe that P'or `P and I believe that not-P'. Thiskind of sentence is logically peculiarbecause it is absurd to assert it, although it isnot a logical contradiction. In this paperI offer a new proposal. I argue that Moore's paradox arises because there is a defaultprocedure for evaluating a self-ascribed belief sentence and one is presumptivelyjustified in believing that one believes a sentence when one sincerely assents to it.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Logic Ontology|
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Hamid Vahid (2005). Moore's Paradox and Evans's Principle: A Reply to Williams. Analysis 65 (288):337–341.
Hamid Vahid (2008). Radical Interpretation and Moore's Paradox. Theoria 74 (2):146-163.
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