Physical and metaphysical necessity

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4):458–485 (2007)
Abstract I propose a different way of thinking about metaphysical and physical necessity: namely that the fundamental notion of necessity is what would ordinarily be called "truth in all physically possible worlds" – a notion which includes the standard physical necessities and the metaphysical ones as well; I suggest that the latter are marked off not as a stricter kind of necessity but by their epistemic status. One result of this reconceptualization is that the Descartes-Kripke argument against naturalism need no longer trouble us. I end by relating the difference between my view and the standard view to the question, whether there could have been a different world than ours.
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