David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):19-34 (1989)
The problem addressed is: whether religious belief, defined here as accepting that God has revealed and that what he has revealed is true, could ever be rational. That is, does the idea of religious belief imply that it is irrational? The author attempts to resolve this problem in favor of religious belief, and suggests how reasons can legitimately function in religious belief. The evidentialist objection to religion is answered, and it is proposed that reasons might function, not to prove that God has revealed, or that what he has revealed is true, but that the choice to believe is a morally responsible one
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