Scotus on the will: The rational power and the dual affections

Vivarium 36 (1):40-54 (1998)
Abstract
Sukjae Lee John Duns Scotus believes it to be undeniably true that we human beings have free will. He does not argue for our freedom but rather explains it. There are two elements which are both characteristic of and essential to Scotus’ account of human will: namely, 1) the will as a self-determining power for opposites, thus a ‘rational’ power; and 2) the ‘dual affections of the will.’2 The significance of each element taken separately is comprehensible if not obvious. We are puzzled, however, when we attempt to ascertain the relation between the two. This paper is an attempt to reach an adequate understanding of this relation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Andy Clark (2002). That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press. 187--205.
    Mary Beth Ingham (2009). Reason in an Age of Anxiety. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:1-14.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    38 ( #38,114 of 1,088,601 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    2 ( #42,750 of 1,088,601 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.