David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Environmental Ethics 18 (3):297-309 (1996)
In the literature of environmental philosophy, the single most potent argument that has been made against the claim that nature may possess intrinsic value in any objective sense is the Humean thesis of projectivism and its associated view that human consciousness is the source of all values. Theorists, in one way or another, have to face up to this challenge. For instance, J. Baird Callicott upholds this Humean foundation to modern Western philosophy. However, by distinguishing between the source and locus of value, he makes it possible to argue that nature is the locus of intrinsic value without at the same time compromising the thesis that human consciousness is the source of all values. On the other hand, Holmses Rolston, III, another eminent environmental philosopher, criticizes the distinction as well as challenges the Humean foundation itself. In this article, I attempt to resolve the disagreement between Callicott and Rolston over this particular distinction, thereby doing justice to the insights which each theorist, undoubtedly, has brought to bear on the issue of intrinsic value, at least as far as individual organisms is concerned. However, I am also critical of both for having failed to draw out the full implications behind certain crucial distinctions that should be made about the notion of intrinsic value itself
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M. Loreau (2014). Reconciling Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian Approaches to Biodiversity Conservation. Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 14 (1):27-32.
Michel Dion (2000). The Moral Status of Non-Human Beings and Their Ecosystems. Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (2):221 – 229.
Michel Dion (2000). The Moral Status of Non‐Human Beings and Their Ecosystems. Philosophy and Geography 3 (2):221-229.
Sarah Fleisher Trainor (2006). Realms of Value: Conflicting Natural Resource Values and Incommensurability. Environmental Values 15 (1):3-29.
W. F. Butler & T. G. Acott (2007). An Inquiry Concerning the Acceptance of Intrinsic Value Theories of Nature. Environmental Values 16 (2):149-168.
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