David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Religious Studies 41 (2):165-181 (2005)
William Rowe and others argue that if ours is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. If this is correct, then if there is no best possible world, it is not so much as possible that God exist. I reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. The key to seeing that it is false, I suggest, is seeing that God is subject to something fairly called moral luck. In this first part of the article, I set up Rowe's argument, indicate my strategy, introduce the notion of moral luck and show how it bears on Rowe's claims.
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Citations of this work BETA
Klaas J. Kraay (2007). Divine Unsurpassability. Philosophia 35 (3-4):293-300.
T. J. Mawson (2008). Divine Eternity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (1):35 - 50.
Brian Leftow (2013). God's Deontic Perfection. Res Philosophica 90 (1):69-95.
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