Deducción Y conocimiento en Los orígenes de la teoría de la demostración (deduction and knowledge in the origins of proof theory)

Theoria 16 (3):521-538 (2001)
Abstract
Este trabajo tiene por objetivo examinar la idea de deducción metamatemática en el programa de Hilbert, mostrando su dependencia de conceptos gnoseológicos, tales como el de conocimiento intuitivo. También se comparará esta concepcion de la deducción con la fundamentación intuicionista de la logica. Sostendré que esta deducción metamatemática lleva a una caracterización de la logica como una teoría de las deducciones formales en un sentido particular.This paper aims to examine the idea of metamathematical deduction in Hilbert’s program showing its dependence of epistemological notions, such as intuitive knowledge. This conception of deduction will be also compared with the intuitionistic foundation of logic. I will argue that this metamathematical deduction leads to a characterization of logic as a theory of formal deductions in a particular sense
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