Extension, Intension and Dormitive Virtue

Abstract
Would be fairer to call Peirce’s philosophy of language “extensionalist” or “intensionalist”? The extensionalisms of Carnap and Quine are examined, and Peirce’s view is found to be prima facie similar, except for his commitment to the importance of “hypostatic abstraction”. Rather than dismissing this form of abstraction (famously derided by Molière) as useless scholasticism, Peirce argues that it represents a crucial (though largely unnoticed) step in much working inference. This, it is argued, allows Peirce to transcend the extensionalist-intensionalist dichotomy itself, through his unique triadic analysis of reference and meaning, by transcending the distinction between (as Quine put it) “things” and “attributes”.
Keywords Peirce  extension  intension  Quine  Carnap
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Catherine Legg, Extension, Intension and Dormitive Virtue
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
J. M. Katz (1990). The Domino Theory. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):3-39.
I. Hanzel (2006). Frege, the Identity ofSinnand Carnap's Intension. History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (3):229-247.
Eric J. Loomis (2006). Empirical Equivalence in the Quine-Carnap Debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508.
Archie J. Bahm (1946). Intension and Extension. New Scholasticism 20 (2):183-183.
Robert G. Meyers (2002). Peirce's Extension of Empiricism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 38 (1/2):137 - 154.
Robert Sinclair (2013). Quine and Conceptual Pragmatism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (3):335-355.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-29

Total downloads

47 ( #33,521 of 1,096,840 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

16 ( #8,509 of 1,096,840 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.