David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):457 – 478 (2007)
This paper considers critically the enterprise of naturalizing the subjective experience of acting intentionally. I specifically expose the limits of the model that conceives of agency as composed of two stages. The first stage consists in experiencing an anonymous intention without being conscious of it as anybody's in particular. The second stage disambiguates this anonymous experience thanks to a mechanism of identification and attribution answering the question: "who is intending to act?" On the basis of phenomenological, clinical, methodological and empirical considerations, I contrast the two-stage anonymity-attribution model of agency with an alternative view that intends to bypass these problems by defining agency as intrinsically subjective at the pre-reflective level.
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Iris van Rooij, Christina Behme, Liane Gabora & Dorothée Legrand (2007). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):659 – 680.
Carmen Weiss, Arvid Herwig & Simone Schütz-Bosbach (2011). The Self in Action Effects: Selective Attenuation of Self-Generated Sounds. Cognition 121 (2):207-218.
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